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Preamble
In August of 2011, the United Kingdom experienced a wave
of riots that swept across the country. The first of these took
place in the Tottenham neighborhood of London, where local
resident Mark Duggan had recently been shot and killed by
police. Within hours, riots had erupted in cities around the
United Kingdom, from Manchester to Bristol, in neighbor-
hoods and communities with no obvious connection to the
events that took place in Tottenham. Violence, vandalism,
and understandable panic gripped the nation. In the midst
of these events, the Guardian–led by Simon Rogers, founder
and current editor of the Datablog–engaged in what might
best be described as a real-time investigative-reporting effort
to cover not only the where, when, and what of these riots,
but also their why and how1. Using social media reports, as 1Datablog
+ UK Riots
2011. The
Guardian,
2011-12
well as court records, extensive data analysis, and on-the-
ground reporting, the Guardian eventually built the story of
how these riots occurred and spread: largely through coordi-
nation efforts facilitated by digital communications. Though
the Guardian’s analysis would eventually reveal–counter to
the claims of Prime Minister David Cameron–that Twitter
and Facebook had played no role in spreading the mayhem,2
2Reading the
Riots. The
Guardian,
12/4/11the rioters had made extensive use of BlackBerry Instant
Messenger service to coordinate their activities. While the
Guardian’s analysis was sufficient to derail Cameron’s call for
a “red button” for social media, RIM–the company that then
ran BlackBerry–chose to cooperate with UK police, turning
over the messages and handles related to the events.3 The
3 London riots:
BlackBerry to
help police by
Josh Halliday.
The Guardian,
8/8/11
9
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next month in New York, the Occupy Wall Street movement
would lead to its own set of arrests, followed by the NYPD’s
courtroom pursuit of Malcolm Harris’s Twitter “metadata”–
especially information about the location of his phone when
he posted certain tweets.4 Even when Twitter attempted to4Twitter Must
Hand Over
Protester
Malcolm
Harris’ Tweets
by Jennifer
Peltz. The
Huffington
Post, 7/2/12
resist cooperating with police,5 they were eventually forced
5Twitter fights
back against
subpoena by
Nilay Patel.
The Verge,
5/8/12
to turn over Harris’ data anyway.6
6Twitter
Turns Over
Protester
Posts by
Tiffany Kary.
Bloomberg,
9/14/12
These events threw into sharp relief the realities of pri-
vacy in the realm of digital communications: Whether mes-
sages were privately sent or publicly shared, users of services
like BlackBerry Instant Messenger and Twitter had few en-
forceable rights around the information they communicated
through these services, or even around information that the
services had about them. Somehow, the evolution of digital
communication systems had given rise to a strange class of
information known as “metadata”: the data about data that
can seemingly reveal almost everything about anyone, and
yet, simultaneously, belongs to no one at all.
Digital Security for Journalists:
A 21st Century Imperative
In the spring of 2013, Guardian reporter Glenn Greenwald
received a set of classified documents from a former NSA
employee who would later be revealed as Edward Snowden.
Among the leaked documents eventually published by both
the Guardian and the Washington Post were some reveal-
ing that the United States’ National Security Agency had
for some time been performing bulk collection of digital
communications metadata records, allegedly from corpora-
tions ranging from U.S. telecom companies to digital service
providers like Google and Yahoo. 7 Though met with public
7NSA paid
millions to
cover Prism
compliance,
The Guardian,
8/22/13
outrage, the response of U.S. lawmakers to these revelations
was decidedly measured: Not only was the program in ques-
tion legal, but these collection practices had been taking
place for some time. Nevertheless, continued reporting by “As far as I
know, this
is the exact
three-month
renewal of
what has been
the case for
the past seven
years,” said
Feinstein.
the Guardian and the Washington Post–for which they would
both eventually win a Pulitzer Prize–indicated a heretofore
unconfirmed fact: that the digital communications systems
that many Americans believed to be importantly private
were, in fact, anything but.
The shocking nature of the Snowden revelations cata-
pulted Greenwald to the center of the ongoing debate about
the future of journalism. In October of 2013, Bill Keller,
former managing editor of the New York Times, invited
Greenwald to debate their views on the essential principles
11
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of journalism in the 21st century in his Times newspaper
column.88 Is Glenn
Greenwald
the Future
of News?,
The New
York Times,
10/27/13
Yet while Keller and Greenwald’s exchange in that column
did highlight their philosophical differences, it glossed some
of the practical ones that were arguably no less significant
to the story: Snowden took his documents to Laura Poitras
and Glenn Greenwald in part because they could meet his
communication-security requirements.
In the past 15 years, digital publishing and communica-
tions have changed the landscape–and even the nature–of
journalism in innumerable ways. Old business models have
collapsed, and are yet to be reasonably replaced. Private
individuals and citizen journalists have access to the same
platforms for publication and can cultivate the same profile
as reporters at major news organizations. The power of the
crowd can be used both to document and condemn. 9 And9 Social media
and the search
for the Boston
bombing
suspects. CBS
News, 4/24/13
yet every corner of our industry–from fashion to finance, the
national desk to national security–is still driven by a single,
essential imperative: Get the story.
There are no stories without sources. Unless researchers,
executives, parents, politicians, religious figures, heads of
state, whistleblowers, and widowers–unless people–are willing
to share information with journalists, our profession cannot
function. Whether what they share with us is a trove of
secret documents, the location of a meeting, or the story of a
loved one lost, without them journalism as we know it ceases
to exist. And yet the missing acknowledgment in Keller
and Greenwald’s debate was exactly this: that a perhaps
fundamental difference in their journalism was a question
of neither form nor philosophy, but of capacity. Greenwald
and his colleagues were able to offer Snowden the digital
protections he demanded. How many of today’s practicing
journalists, independent or institutional, can effectively do
the same?
That certain professional practices are essential not just
to the integrity but the viability of the journalistic enter-
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prise is already codified into our professional practice. Libel
training and editorial review help protect journalists and
their institutions from debilitating lawsuits. Reputable news
organizations have articulated codes of conduct designed to
sharply limit the personal benefit reporters may derive from
their professional activities; many also have explicit conflict
of interest surveys that reporters must file on a regular ba-
sis.10 And yet in many newsrooms, the consideration given
10NPR Ethics
Handbook:
Indepen-
dence. NPR,
Retrieved:
6/5/14
to the systematic protection of our most valuable assets–our
sources–is uneven at best.
There can be little dispute at this point that journalism,
even within the United States, is under legal and technical
attack.11 The year 2013 saw virtually unprecedented crimi-
11AP Presi-
dent accuses
DOJ of source
intimidation,
Jennifer C.
Kerr. AP,
6/19/13
nal charges leveled against both journalists and their sources.
In some cases, members of the press have been forced to
risk jail time to defend their sources; in others, they never
had the chance.12 And major news organizations13 have
12Will Eric
Holder Back
Off?, Emily
Bazelon.
Slate, 6/2/14;
DOJ scrutiny
of James
Rosen draws
fire, Ann E.
Marimow.
Washington
Post, 5/20/13
13 e.g. The
New York
Times, Wash-
ington Post,
Bloomberg,
Wall Street
Journal
acknowledged repeated hacking attempts on their systems,
at least some of which are known to be direct efforts to un-
cover sources. Major communications companies have also
acknowledged that a significant proportion of digital hacking
targets are journalists.
Whatever the dollar cost of a lawsuit or a system recov-
ery, the detriment that these events pose to our industry
is incalculable. At the same time that Snowden’s conscious
choice to share his information with recognized journalists
may inspire confidence in the continued importance of pro-
fessional journalism, the difficulties he experienced in doing
so securely14 point to a significant deficiency in our existing
14No Place to
Hide – review,
Philippe
Sands. The
Guardian,
5/23/14
practices. Moreover, his very revelations only confirm how
thin is the veil that protects our digital communications from
the eyes of others, whether they be governments’, lawyers’,
service providers’, or hackers’. As this understanding rightly
permeates the public consciousness, the chilling effects will
be immeasurable.
In order to maintain the confidence of–and therefore the
14 COLUMBIA JOURNALISM SCHOOL | TOW CENTER FOR DIGITAL JOURNALISM
access to–our sources, it is imperative that the journalistic
profession as a whole develops a coherent set of professional
practices around their protection. While judicial decisions
and statutes in 49 states and the District of Columbia pro-
vide some form of reportorial “privilege,”15 the legal and15 Journalists’
Privilege,
Kathleen Ann
Ruane. CRS,
1/19/11
technical realities of digital communications systems today
are such that many journalists will never have the opportu-
nity to invoke it.
For robust journalistic security practices to be effective,
they must both offer the real protections that sources deserve
and be reasonable enough to integrate into the process of
newsgathering and publication. To achieve these ends, any
approach must be grounded in a fundamental understanding
of the technical and legal frameworks in which our digital
communications exist, and how their sometimes strange in-
tersections influence the way that journalists must operate.
The goal of this paper is to provide a coherent and salient
introduction to these frameworks, as a foundation for de-
veloping supportable security practices for the journalism
industry.
The genesis of this research stems directly from recent
events: the Associated Press phone records scandal and the
Snowden revelations that took place in the spring of 2013.
Though I came to this topic well-versed in the basics of
digital communication technologies, my collaborative de-
velopment of a mobile application for secure, anonymous,
authenticated communication had made me acutely aware
that creating better tools for secure digital communications
was only a part of the problem, and I was happy to leave the
job of offering practical digital security advice to those with
more experience than I. Yet as I reviewed existing guides
and recommendations, I found that few of these resources
were comprehensive in their discussions of the “when” and
“why” of digital security. This is with good reason. There is
no such thing as generic “security”, and even when contextu-
alized, its practices must effectively navigate any number of
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legal and technical pitfalls.
As I began this work, I spoke anecdotally with journalism
colleagues who employed secure digital communication tech-
nologies in their work. In the process, the first outlines of a
pattern began to emerge. Those who understood and applied
digital security practices to their reporting, even occasion-
ally, were either themselves covering sensitive topic areas
like the NSA–and therefore came to these understandings
of professional necessity–or, like me, they had a sufficiently
technical background to parse these topics for themselves.
This paper strives to provide an accessible level of technical
and legal understanding for the broader journalism com-
munity, so that as an industry we can begin to have an in-
formed conversation about how the realities of today’s digital
communications systems should be appropriately addressed
within our work.
The remainder of this paper is organized into four sec-
tions. First and second, I present overviews of the current
state of law and technology as they exist in and shape the
realities of digital communications, privacy, and security
with a focus on the needs of source protection for journalists.
Third, I present some models for conceptualizing and imple-
menting digital communications practices for journalists and
newsrooms, in the context of current tools and communities.
Finally, I offer recommendations for both industry develop-
ment and academic research in the areas of digital privacy
and security.
Interlude: Addressing Complexity
The difficulty of creating simple models to describe digital
security risks and solutions stems from the fact that they
must operate at the place where two major social systems–
whose properties are almost perfectly juxtaposed–intersect.
First, there is the law, which is intentionally slow, exhaus-
tive, cautious, and reactive. Then, there is technology, which
is inherently fast, emergent, experimental, and constructive.
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And while our lives are shaped by both of them on a daily
basis, their inner workings remain almost entirely invisible to
all but the most highly initiated.
The crafting of laws and rendering of legal decisions often
hinge on the byzantine interleaving of statutes, case law,
and judicial inference that is argued in courts and described
in documents away from the public view, and ultimately
codified as binary decisions on the particulars of a given
case. Technologies, meanwhile, exemplify the unpredictably
complex expression of equally binary decision trees as they
interact with the human world, yet their public form is often
intentionally not readable by humans. The result is that
nearly all of the workings of both systems are inaccessible
to the public, expressed as they are in coded language and
housed on largely proprietary systems.
In a healthy democratic society, the collective effect of
citizens’ individual actions in the political, economic, and
social spheres constitute cultural “forces of nature.” In this
ecosystem, individual technologies are like cultivars–while
their general features are known, their ultimate forms and
behaviors are inextricably tied to their interaction with the
broader environment. Law, meanwhile, is the “gardener” of
that environment, and its role is necessarily reactionary and
unequivocal. Prune here, thin there, tie back some stems and
add support to others. Law does not determine what tech-
nologies come into being, and only once a “species” is known
can law attempt to proactively influence its characteristics.
As law and technology react and respond to one another,
they create an ecosystem whose state is both dynamic and
unpredictable. In order to be successful, digital security prac-
tices must be adaptive enough to acclimate to the changing
circumstances of this emergent system.
Fortunately, our worlds are comprised almost entirely of
similarly emergent systems–from the flow of traffic to the
workings of party politics–and all of us capably navigate un-
told numbers of them in the course of our daily lives. The
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main difference between these and our digital communica-
tions systems is that most of these others operate largely
in the visible and/or physical world, and follow rules that
are accessible to us. The key, therefore, to creating a set of
principles that supports journalistic values within digital
communications systems is to make these systems at least
conceptually “visible,” and to translate the rules by which
they operate into language that is broadly accessible to our
community.
Digital Security is Not Sui Generis
In the physical world, we accept that privacy and security
are context dependent. We appreciate that jaywalking is
generally less safe than crossing at a stoplight, that postcards
and loud public telephone conversations are less private
than sealed letters and whispered exchanges. If we latch
our yard gate, we do so knowing it will probably not stop a
determined criminal, but may deter an opportunistic one.
We know our front door deadbolt will not stop a SWAT
team, but may delay an intruder long enough for our loved
ones to escape to safety. An alarm system cannot extinguish
a fire, but it may alert professionals to an emergency.
We are able to make informed judgments about our physi-
cal privacy and security because the rules and assumptions of
the systems they involve are generally apparent and under-
standable to us. We also appreciate that these judgments–
and the choices we make on their basis–are inherently prob-
abilistic and imperfect. Crossing the street involves making
numerous estimates about the speed of traffic, one’s own
crossing pace, and even the conditions of the road. An incor-
rect estimate may put you or those around you at substantial
risk. Simiarly, a “shoulder surfer” may read our email at a
cafe; a fellow passenger on a train may read documents we
are holding. At all points we appreciate that neither our
security nor our privacy is absolute.
This is exactly the same appreciation we must develop in
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our interactions with digital communications systems. As the
forthcoming sections illustrate, the digital world is subject to
all of the same complexities and probabilities as the physical
one. And just as we have all learned the skills necessary to
cross the street safely despite ever-changing road conditions,
so too we can all learn to navigate the digital world in a way
that keeps our sources–and ourselves–safe. We just need to
learn how to look both ways.
The Law: Security and Privacy in
Context
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.”
–U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV
“Privacy” and “security” in digital communications with
sources can be thought of as two sides of the same coin: Our
ability to offer our sources a sense of security in communi-
cating with us is directly proportional to our ability to keep
their real identities private. Central to effectively maintain-
ing this privacy in the context of digital communications,
however, is understanding the “right to privacy” as codified
by the legal particularities that govern information retention
and exchange in the digital realm.
Understanding the source and the scope of these distinc-
tions begins with the notion of privacy itself. What does
“privacy” really mean? While most of us have a loose notion
that the Fourth Amendment affords us a “right to privacy,”
this isn’t precisely the case. The Fourth Amendment, as
written, affords us protection from “unreasonable search” by
governmental authorities which, through legal precedent has
come to include a notion of “privacy” as well.
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The Judicial View of Privacy: The Fourth Amendment
and Third-Party Doctrine
Over the course of many decades, the character of the Amer-
ican “right to privacy” has been both enshrined and cir-
cumscribed by the nature of the space in which an object
or activity exists, and the process through which informa-
tion about those activities is obtained. Individuals’ “persons,
houses, papers and effects” constitute private realms that
should not be intruded upon by the government except in
the presence of probable cause and the issuance of a war-
rant; where a space–either virtual or physical–is shared with
others, its “public” character dictates that no right to pri-
vacy exists. This dichotomy is sometimes expressed via the
shorthand: “No right to privacy in public.”
Over time, the Supreme Court has occasionally inter-
preted and expanded the list of realms deemed “private,”
and therefore safe from unwarranted search. It was in the
1967 case Katz v. United States that Justice Harlan, in a
concurring opinion, coined the term “reasonable expectation
of privacy” that has largely come to represent the popular
understanding of a constitutional right to privacy. At issue
in Katz was law enforcement’s placement of a recording de-
vice on a public telephone booth, through which it captured
the contents of the defendant’s end of a phone conversation.
In ruling for the defendant, the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment protected “people, not places.” Harlan’s same
concurring opinion asserted that “electronic, as well as phys-
ical, intrusion into a place…may constitute a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.”
Yet the protections of Katz are highly circumscribed.
Importantly, the contents of the conversation obtained in
Katz were procured directly from the defendant himself by
recording his own words. This makes Katz a “first party”
to the content of the search, which is required for a Fourth
Amendment claim. Because of this crucial detail, the ruling
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in Katz has little bearing on situations where information has
been knowingly shared with others. Though in
U.S. v War-
shak (2010),
the Sixth Cir-
cuit asserted
the defendants’
privacy in-
terest in the
contents of
their emails,
the law sup-
porting the
search has not
proven uncon-
stitutional.
In 1976, this distinction was reinforced in United States v.
Miller, wherein the court held that there can be no expec-
tation of privacy around information–in this case, financial–
that an individual has “voluntarily conveyed and…exposed”
to a third party when he or she is aware that it may be
shared with still others “in the ordinary course of busi-
ness.” Three years later, the court cited the Miller decision
in Smith v. Maryland, which affirmed law enforcement’s right
to obtain the numbers dialed by an individual when placing
a telephone call, on the basis that “telephone users…typically
know that the numbers they dial are transmitted to the
phone company and recorded.” Under this rubric, which
still applies today, telephone users have no “expectation of
privacy” around the numbers they dial, even from a home
telephone.
Together, the rulings in Miller and Smith help form the
basis of what is broadly termed the “third-party doctrine” in
American judicial proceedings, which holds that any informa-
tion shared with a third party is not “private” with respect
to the Fourth Amendment. As will be discussed below, only
in cases where “privilege” has been established around a par-
ticular relationship (such as those with a doctor, lawyer, or,
in some jurisdictions, a journalist) is there an exception to
this general rule of thumb. Outside of such circumstances,
Miller asserts, citizens should expect that any time they
voluntarily expose information to a company or its equip-
ment there is “the risk that the company would share that
information with the police.”
Though discussed in terms of privacy, it is worth noting
that the decisions in Katz, Miller and Smith still hinge fun-
damentally on the Fourth Amendment’s protection against
“unreasonable search”: Thus the core of the reasoning re-
lates not to what was obtained, but how it was obtained.
In Katz, the “search” of the defendant’s conversation was
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made on his own person, whereas in Miller and Smith the
search was of the defendants’ financial institution and tele-
phone service provider, respectively. The “reasonableness”
of the search is therefore evaluated with respect to the rights
of the organization in question, not the account holder(s),
regardless of whether the search reveals information that
pertains to them. Similar reasoning led to the 2012 decision
in United States v. Graham , which held that “historical cell
site” data–the telecommunication providers’ records of the
cell towers to which a subscriber’s phone has connected–is
not protected by the Fourth Amendment.
The Legislative View of Privacy: ECPA & FISA
The Electronic Communications and Privacy Act
(ECPA)
In the decades since the decisions in Miller and Katz, bank
transactions and telephone digits have become only two of
the many types of metadata generated by the digital commu-
nications systems used by the public on a regular basis. And
while the Supreme Court’s rulings indicate that there is no
constitutional right to privacy around this metadata, this in
no way limits the ability of Congress to pass laws expanding
individuals’ privacy rights around these records. This fact
has led to several pieces of legislation doing just that, includ-
ing The Right to Financial Privacy Act (12 U.S.C. §3401),
Video Privacy Protection Act(18 U.S.C. §2710) and HIPAA
(42 C.F.R. §403.812).
Some of the earliest, and still most relevant, legislation
in this area is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA) of 1986, which defines the classes of metadata that
telephone and electronic service providers may be compelled
to share with law enforcement. Though successful in enhanc-
ing privacy protections in the context of real-time telephone
wiretapping, ECPA was written at a time before email was
commonplace, and when electronic storage costs were high
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and local-only access was the norm. The result is that while
it remains the primary piece of legislation that governs data
collection and sharing requirements for electronic commu-
nications today, the application of its provisions to both
wired and wireless mobile communications, as well as online
services, seems to expose more than it protects.
Crucially, the Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C.
§2701-12) portion of ECPA, and, in particular, its “Required
Disclosure Of Customer Communications or Records” pro-
vision (18 U.S.C. §2703), enumerates the data points that
service providers must turn over to law enforcement when
provided with a subpoena. 16 As enumerated in section
16With the
exception of
18 U.S.C.
§2703(d),
which requires
some showing
before a judge.
Both are less
stringent than
the “prob-
able cause”
required to ob-
tain a warrant.
(c)(2), this information includes:
(A) name
(B) address
(C) local and long distance records, or records of session times &
durations, including type of service used
(D) length of service, including start date
(E) telephone, instrument number or other subscriber number or
identity, including any temporary network address
(F) means and source of payment, including credit card or bank
account number if applicable
In the context of the technologies then prevalent, the
metadata that ECPA makes available to law enforcement
was not nearly as revealing of citizens’ day-to-day activi-
ties as it is currently. According to recent research, review-
ing even the relatively broad locational data accessible via
GPS can illustrate an individual’s movements and activities
beyond what would be meaningfully feasible via physical
surveillance. The “mosaic theory” concludes that “compre-
hensive aggregation of even seemingly innocuous data reveals
greater insight than consideration of each piece of informa-
tion in isolation.”17 Yet because we may “voluntarily share”
17When
Enough is
Enough,
Bellovin et al.
NYU Journal
of Law, 2014
our GPS location (and even more fine-grained cell-site) data
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by virtue of our service contract with a provider, this infor-
mation is not considered private. A similar circumstance is
created when we surf the Web, as our Internet protocol (IP)
address is shared with virtually every website we visit.For more
detail, see the
next chapter. The implications of ECPA are not limited to metadata,however. Section (a) of the “Required Disclosure” clause
discussed above provides that contents of “electronic commu-
nications” in electronic storage that are more than 180 days
old may be obtained by law enforcement via an administra-
tive subpoena. Although the act explicitly exempts from the
definition of “electronic communications” the kind of oral,
tone-based, GPS and financial data that in 1986 constituted
most of the general public’s phone calls and wire transfers,
it explicitly includes any “transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data or intelligence”(18 U.S.C. §2510(12)):
an almost perfect description of email. The result is that any
email on a provider’s server that has been opened or is more
than six months old may have its contents accessed via such
a subpoena.18 U.S.C.
§2705(a) pro-
vides for a
renewable
delay of no-
tification for
a period of
90 days if
notification
may have
an “adverse
result.”
FISA & the PATRIOT Act–Ambiguity Abounds
Thus far, the policies we have discussed actually apply to
anyone’s electronic communications, not only those of jour-
nalists. In fact, the only part of ECPA that makes journalist-
relevant stipulations is the controversial “business records”
section of the PATRIOT Act (215–now 50 U.S.C. §1861).
Though section 1(a) of the law allows the FBI to “require
production of any tangible things” as part of an investiga-
tion to obtain “foreign intelligence information,” this only
applies “provided that such an investigation is not conducted
solely upon activities protected by the First Amendment”[50
U.S.C. §1861(1)(a)]. Unfortunately, this latter character-
ization is described only in the guidelines of the Attorney
General. Though these guidelines have been revised and
their protections expanded18 since the AP phone records
18Holder
Tightens Rules
on Getting
Reporters’
Data, by Char-
lie Savage.
The New
York Times,
7/12/13
scandal in the spring of 2013, these guidelines do not carry
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the force of law; journalists and their organizations have no
legal recourse if they are breached.
As Eve Burton
points out:
“The AP
cannot march
into court and
sue the DOJ.”Why Metadata Matters
“Although the law provides less protection for metadata
than content, metadata can be even more revelatory than
content itself.”
–Susan Landau19 19Making
Sense from
Snowden,
Susan Lan-
dau. IEEE
Computer and
Reliability
Societies, 8/13
While the target of the AP phone records collection situa-
tion is still uncertain, the implications of metadata collection
for journalists are clearly illustrated in the cases of both
James Rosen and James Risen, whose alleged sources were
first identified by law enforcement based on the analysis
of telephone, email, and other communications’ metadata.
Coupled with the uncertain standing of reporters’ privilege
(discussed below), these cases are particularly troubling as
there are indications that they are the early threads of a
trend, as suggested by a department of justice official:
“As a general matter, prosecutions of those who leaked
classified information to reporters have been rare, due, in
part, to the inherent challenges involved in identifying the
person responsible for the illegal disclosure and in compiling
the evidence necessary to prove it beyond a reasonable
doubt.”20 20A High-
Tech War
on Leaks, by
Adam Liptak.
The New
York Times,
2/11/12
What makes up metadata?
Email: to, from, subject line, timestamp, attachment names,
IP address
Mobile activity: origin number, target number, tower lo-
cation, time, call duration, account holder information,
hardware phone ID
26 COLUMBIA JOURNALISM SCHOOL | TOW CENTER FOR DIGITAL JOURNALISM
What’s Next
In recent months, conflicting conclusions about the constitu-
tionality of metadata collection by the government have been
evident in decisions issued by various circuit courts. Specif-
ically, in ACLU v. Clapper (2014)21 the 2rd Circuit held21ACLU v.
Clapper –
Challenge to
NSA, ACLU,
retrieved:
6/6/14
that metadata is not private, and that under FISA following
connections up to three links away from the target part is
acceptable. In December of 2013, however, the opposite rul-
ing was reached by the D.C. Circuit in the case of Klayman
v. Obama. As of April, 2014, however, the Supreme Court
refused to hear Klayman22 , meaning that it is likely to be22 Supreme
Court de-
clines look
at NSA case,
Lawrence Hur-
ley. Reuters,
4/7/14
some time before more clarity on these issues is gained.
Privilege & Source Protection
Testifying Against Sources
At the federal level, the question of reporters’ privilege re-
mains, in the words of one prominent law firm “in disar-
ray.”2323Amicus
Brief, Risen v
United States,
LSKS, LLP.
3/26/14
The Supreme Court recently rejected James Risen’s ap-
peal,24 though without much explanation. Nonetheless, there
24 Justices re-
ject reporter’s
bid to protect
source. AP,
6/2/14
are still a number of directly conflicting decisions in courts at
the district level.
At the core of these conflicts are ongoing gaps in inter-
pretations of 1972’s Branzburg v. Hayes–the most recent
Supreme Court decision related to reporters’ privilege.
Though in Branzburg the reporter’s petition to quash a
subpoena for appearance before a criminal grand jury was
ultimately denied on the facts of the case, a concurring opin-
ion by Justice Powell is sometimes interpreted as confirming
the existence of some reportorial privilege, because in it
Branzburg v. Hayes, Concurringhe asserts the importance
of “striking the proper balance between freedom of the press
and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony.”
While the Risen decision speaks poorly for the promise
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of any federal reporter’s privilege, even in cases where it
has been upheld, Branzburg makes clear that any privilege
applies only to journalists, not their sources:
“We note first that the privilege claimed is that of the re-
porter, not the informant, and that, if the authorities inde-
pendently identify the informant, neither his own reluctance
to testify nor the objection of the newsman would shield
him from grand jury inquiry, whatever the impact on the
flow of news or on his future usefulness as a secret source of
information.”25 25 Branzburg
v. Hayes,
Opinion of
The Court,
Justic White.
6/29/72
Thus, reporters wishing to protect their sources must do
everything in their power to prevent their being indepen-
dently identified by law enforcement, as once this has been
accomplished the source may be vulnerable to prosecution.
In point of fact, reporter testimony often may be unneces-
sary to identify sources, as explicitly noted in Risen’s case.
In granting Risen’s motion to quash his subpoena to appear
before a grand jury, Judge Leonie M. Brinkema wrote that
Risen’s testimony was probably unnecessary as the govern-
ment already had “numerous telephone records, e-mail mes-
sages, computer files and testimony that strongly indicates
that Sterling was Risen’s source.”
As noted, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia,
meanwhile, have case law or legislation that offer journal-
ists some protection from being compelled to identify their
sources. As the foregoing discussion illustrates, however,
the authorities rarely need to obtain this information via
reporters’ testimony when journalists have been communicat-
ing with their sources digitally–the metadata associated with
these communications is often sufficient to identify who is
speaking with whom. Because of this, it is increasingly likely
that even where some form of journalist privilege exists,
reporters will never get the chance to invoke it;
the kind of metadata collection/analysis being conducted
at the federal level is known to take place at the state and
local level as well.26
26Agencies
collected data
on Ameri-
cans, Ellen
Nakashima.
The Wash-
ington Post,
12/9/13
“This isn’t the
NSA asking for
information.”
-Senator
Edward J.
Markey (D-
MA)
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Data and Testimony–Where Encryption Assists
Metadata and direct testimony, of course, are not the only
means by which the authorities can obtain information about
a journalist’s sources. Searches of digital storage, such as a
computers, hard drives and mobile phones, may reveal source
identities and more.27 Where the data in question has been27Armed
agents seize
records of
reporter, Guy
Taylor. The
Washing-
ton Times,
10/25/13
encrypted, however, protecting it is still possible in certain
circumstances.
A recent Seventh Circuit ruling held that forcing a defen-
dant to decrypt the contents of a drive to which he had not
already admitted having access and control was likely a vio-
lation of his Fifth Amendment rights. In some cases, simply
requiring the act of decryption has been classed merely as
“production” of materials–similar to handing over the key to
a lockbox–and not subject to Fifth Amendment protection.
Yet the Seventh Circuit pointed out that in some cases the
act of production “has communicative aspects of its own”:
“…compliance with a subpoena tacitly concedes: (1) the ex-
istence of the documents, (2) their possession or control by
the accused, and (3) the accused’s belief that the documents
are authentic.”2828 Judge Says
Giving Up
Your Password
May Be A 5th
Amendment
Violation,
Mike Masnick.
Techdirt,
4/25/13
Thus, unless the government can “establish its knowledge
of the existence, possession, and authenticity of the subpoe-
naed documents with ‘reasonable particularity’ ” one may
be able to resist a subpoena that requires decrypting data in
response to a subpoena.
As indicated in this same opinion, however, Fifth Amend-
ment protections can only be applied to communications
which “relate a factual assertion or disclose information,”
and do not generally apply to actions such as standing in a
lineup or providing a handwriting sample. As a result, de-
cryption mechanisms that require only a fingerprint or facial
recognition may not afford the same level of legal protec-
tion.29
29Apple’s
Fingerprint
ID May
Mean You
Can’t “Take
the Fifth”,
Marcia Hoff-
man. Wired,
9/12/13
The Technology:
Understanding the Infrastructure
of Digital Communications
Prologue: The Design Imperative of the Internet
The essential framework for the design of the modern In-
ternet was first described by Paul Baran in a 10-page paper
published in March of 1964. Issued as part of the IEEE’s
“Transactions of the Professional Technical Group on Com-
munications Systems,”30 the introduction to the paper– 30On Dis-
tributed Com-
munications
Networks, Paul
Baran. IEEE
CS-12, (1),
3/64
entitled, “On Distributed Communications Networks”–begins
with the following sentence:
“Let us consider the synthesis of a communication network
which will allow several hundred major communications
stations to talk with one another after an enemy attack.”
The paper goes on to describe the salient features of such
a network, designed as a direct response to the most terri-
fying threat of the then-ongoing Cold War: a large-scale,
long-range, distributed attack on American soil.
Just as George Washington forewent postal mail and
employed private couriers to send messages to his troops31
31 Spreading
the News:
The American
Postal System
from Franklin
to Morse.
Richard R.
John, 2009.
during the Revolutionary War, the U.S. military sought
to guarantee the integrity and availability of its own com-
munications in case of a substantial attack on commercial
networks during the Cold War. Achieving this, however,
29
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required that the system be all of the things that the tele-
phone system of the day was not: distributed, redundant,
asynchronous, relatively unpredictable, and cheap. Rather
than requiring the synchronous, persistent connections of
telephony, which transmitted information through the hubs
and spokes of a decentralized network, the Internet would
function something like an automated, multi-hop telegraph:
Digital messages would be broken into pieces and individu-
ally addressed to the destination on the sender’s end, then
collected and reassembled at the other.
Centralized
and decentral-
ized networks
fail quickly
in the case of
malfunction or
destruction.
As anyone who has ever chosen the “ship as items become
available” option knows, there is advantage to breaking up
“deliveries” in this way. Packages (or in the case of the In-
ternet, packets) can be routed opportunistically, moving to-
ward their destination along whichever delivery path is most
readily available. In addition to maximizing capacity, this
approach also provides a certain level of unpredictability:
Not even the operator of the system, much less an adversary,
can know with complete certainty what the paths of these
packets will be.
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All Internet
traffic is
broken up into
equal-sized
packets.
Data
packets take
independent
paths across
the Internet
once they leave
your service
provider.
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Because the packets are small, there is room for redun-
dancy: The same packets can be cheaply sent multiple times
to ensure delivery. This means that the cost of losing any
given packet is small; if the first copy doesn’t reach the des-
tination, the second or third will. In the worst case scenario,
the packets’ return address can be used to ask for any found
missing.
Data
packets may
be regularly
dropped or
lost in transit.
At the infrastructure level, this cheap redundancy–
especially coupled with the return-address safety net–ensures
that neither the individual routing nodes nor their actual
connections to one another need be especially reliable. Con-
nections may be intermittent or interrupted; nodes may
malfunction or be destroyed. This means that the stations
themselves can be both cheap and plentiful–and the more
plentiful the nodes, the more resilient the network. Or, as
Baran put it, the distributed network of the Internet is one:
“…in which system destruction requires the enemy to pay
the price of destroying n of n stations. If n is made suffi-
ciently large, it can be shown that highly survivable system
structures can be built, even in the thermonuclear era.”32
32On Dis-
tributed Com-
munications
Networks, Paul
Baran. IEEE
CS-12, (1),
3/64
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If the re-
cipient device
discovers a
piece missing,
it can request
another copy.
This re-
quest is made
possible by the
requirement
that packets
travel with
a “return
address.”
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In other words: an atomized communications solution for
the atomic age.
Understanding the Internet
The vulnerabilities that your data faces in terms of obser-
vation, collection, and manipulation–both legal and illegal–
stem directly from some of the essential features of the sys-
tem described above. In order to function, the network of
nodes and links that comprise the Internet requires certain
information (target and return addresses, for example) to be
attached to every data packet it sends. Moreover, the dis-
tributed nature of the system means that this information is
seen by a large number of nodes and the parties that operate
them.
Yet while we have little control over the exposure of meta-
data like the “to” and “from” addresses of our emails, choos-
ing the right connection methods and using the right tools
appropriately can reduce the general observability of our
data as it traverses the Internet. By coupling an understand-
ing of how digital communication systems work with the
capacities of secure-communications tools, we can develop
and adapt effective strategies for improving the privacy of
our communications with sources and colleagues.
Getting to the Web
In the first incarnation of the commercial Web, the number
of hands that touched your data on its way to and from the
Internet was especially apparent. Accessing the Internet
required that you wire your computer to a physical modem
which was itself plugged into a telephone line and had it call
a dedicated Internet service provider (ISP) when you wanted
to connect. Because users typically paid by the minute and
Web indices like Yahoo and Google did not yet exist, ISPs
like America Online (AOL) often leveraged their gatekeeper
status, funneling users through a proprietary landing page,
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with the broader Web only accessible beyond its threshold.
In this configuration, the parties who could “see” our online
activity were fairly apparent: the telephone company that
received the call, and the ISP whose portal we used to send
and receive data from the Web.
Though most of the visible signposts have since disap-
peared, our digital information passes through the same sets
of hands today. In most cases, in fact, only two things have
changed. In 2014, our telecom provider and Internet service
provider will likely be one and the same, and our actual ac-
cess to the Web–whether on a computer, phone, or tablet–
is probably wireless. While undoubtedly convenient, these
changes also mean that today the records of our online ac-
tivities are concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, and as
we walk around with our devices, the default configuration
of our digital “return addresses” provides a more and more
minute trace of our physical movements.
Let’s Get Physical
Computers, mobile phones, and tablets are our tangible
interfaces to the networked digital world. At some point, as
they send and receive information over the Web, all of those
virtual messages have to find their way back to the correct
physical device so that we can access that email or load that
news story. In the case of wireless routers, any number of
devices may be connected to the same data “pipe.” In order
to correctly send and return all those little data packets
that make up a Web page or even a Tweet, a wireless router
must be able to uniquely identify each individual device. To
make this possible, every Internet-enabled device on earth is
assigned a unique machine address code (MAC) at the time
of manufacture. By combining pieces of this ID with pieces
of its own address, wireless routers are able to accurately
exchange information with the Web on behalf of dozens of
devices at a time.
The MAC
address is
a set of six
semicolon-
separated
letter/number
pairs: the
first three sets
comprise the
“vendor id”
indicating
the device
manufacturer,
such Apple
or Sony. The
second three
sets are the
“device” ID.
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Getting Connected
When a computer or wireless device is looking for a con-
nection, it essentially does so by shouting its MAC out to
the world and waiting for a router to respond, like a digital
version of the kids’ game “Marco Polo.” The wireless router
then uses the latter half of that MAC to create a temporary
ID for your device, which it will store along with a variation
on the Internet protocol (IP) address that the router itself
has been assigned by your ISP. While the former is used to
send information from the router back to your device, the
latter is used as the “return address” for the information
your device sends out to the Web. Because each of these is
created anew every time your device connects to the router,
your device’s “return address” will change slightly each time
you connect.In a well-
managed
system your
device’s MAC
should never
move past
the router.
A malicious
party operat-
ing the router,
however, can
capture this
information.
Likewise, though IP addresses are designed to describe the
geography of the digital world, they have a direct mapping
to the physical world as well. This is not an accident; the
opportunistic routing of the Internet only works if a node
can tell which of its neighbors is the closest to the final desti-
nation marked on the particular packet. This is the layer at
which digital and physical location correlate: For the ISP, a,
IP address can be mapped, not just to a general geographic
vicinity, but all the way down an individual router.
This illustrates just one of the ways in which our digital
activities can be mapped to our physical identities: Not only
does our ISP know the precise location of individual routers,
it knows who pays the bills for them, including name, ad-
dress, and credit card or other financial information. Since
all of these are available for subpoena under the ECPA rules
mentioned above, it is easy to see how Web browsing–more
so from the home–is almost never substantively “private,”
especially from law enforcement or other government entities.
In point of fact, the wireless router in your home (if you
use one) is not the only router through which your Web traf-
fic is likely to pass. Almost all major ISPs have even larger
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routers that they use to route traffic from their customers in
a particular geographic area out to the broader Web. Typi-
cally it is actually this latter, more general IP address that is
visible to the broader Internet.
You can
view your
own current
IP address
by visiting:
What’s my IP?
Your Data’s Identity
In the course of a day, most of us connect to the Web from
at least several wireless access points–even more when we
consider our mobile devices. Unfortunately, the “return ad-
dress” IP information our data packets carry with them is
by no means the only, or even the most granular, data that
our Web activities carry with them. A great deal of informa-
tion is stored in the software we use to actually access the
Web: namely, Web browsers and apps. For example, most
browsers share information about your operating system
and browser type with websites, primarily so that they can
provide you with the best user experience. Added to this,
Most websites
can see - and
log - the time,
your browser
type, and your
location.
Web “cookies” - small bits of text stored on your hard drive
via your browser - can be used to track your Web activity. See “How
cookies track
you” for more.Though cookies set by one website cannot be detected orread by another, companies like Google can set cookies on so
many sites that even their cookies alone can uniquely iden-
tify a user;33 programs that can access browsing history can
33NSA uses
Google cookies
to pinpoint
targets, An-
drea Peterson.
The Wash-
ington Post,
12/12/13
do this as well.34 This browser “fingerprint” can be used to
34Why Johnny
Can’t Browse
in Peace,
Lukasz Olejnik
et al. 5th PET
Workshop,
7/13/12
draw together otherwise disparate threads of Web activity,
and revealing your own identity and potentially that of a
source.
Thus, every time we request a Web page, we are not only
locating ourselves to our service provider, but fingerprinting
and timestamping our traffic across locations, like thousands
of pieces of digital registered mail. Moreover, even if the res-
olution of our “return address” is not particularly granular
to the outside Web, there are other ways that our digital
“fingerprint” can be connected to our physical identity. This
is exactly what we do when we log in to a Web service, be it
Facebook, or Gmail, or Twitter, or Amazon.com. To these
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providers–or anyone who is eavesdropping on their com-
munications or who has access to their logs–the browser
fingerprint, digital-geographic “return address” and physical
identity of Web activity is not only timestamped and trans-
parent, but highly detailed and often verified, through billing
or other personal information.
Though our device’s exact “return address” on a network
will change slightly each time one reconnects, browser finger-
prints tend to change little over the course of weeks or even
months. Once linked to your real identity, it can be used
fairly effectively to track your activity on the Web across
swathes of time and space.
The above applies regardless of which type of wireless de-
vice one uses to connect to the Internet: Laptops, tablets,
and Internet-enabled mobile phones all employ these same
mechanisms. Of course, given the constant signal hand-off
among cell-towers required in order for you to walk down the
street with a mobile device and carry on a phone conversa-
tion, load a Webpage, or provide required emergency services
access, your service provider can physically pinpoint your
phone to within 50 to 300 meters at any given time.3535 Enhanced
9-1-1 Wireless
Services, FCC,
Retrieved:
6/7/14
What About the “Bad” Guys?
Until this point, we have been considering data collection,
retention, and access that fall within the current business
and legal norms of the United States. Whether these meet
our personal preferences or professional requirements, they
represent the default operating environment for digital com-
munications when, in effect, all parties are following the
rules.
But there are other players on the system as well. Hack-
ers, identity thieves and hostile observers may also wish to
track our behavior, identify us, and access or manipulate
our accounts. Though we cannot control what metadata will
be sent along with our information requests over the Web,
we do have some choices about how it is sent. Making these
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choices wisely can have an enormous impact on the relative
visibility of our Web activity to unauthorized observers.
Nothing But Noise
Whether bridging the physical gap between your device and
a wireless router or sending data across the network to and
from a website, there are two broad classes of connections
available in each case: unsecured and secured. In an unse-
cured connection, information sent between the two points
is transmitted in “clear” or “plain” text–as readable as this
sentence to any party watching. With a secured connection,
at least some level of encryption–essentially scrambling of the
message–is applied before information is sent over the net-
work, drastically reducing the ability of outside observers to
infer what’s being sent. As we will see below, these situations
are analogous to sending and receiving postcards and letters
(in envelopes), respectively.
Not surprisingly, the information that an observer can
see depends upon his or her position in the network. If you
connect to an unsecured wireless network, your Web activ-
ity (what pages you are visiting and so on) is potentially
observable by any other device on that same network . If
For example,
see Julian
Oliver’s “Re-
constructing
images from
Web traffic”
you connect to an unsecured website, the information you
are sending back and forth to that website is potentially ob-
servable by anyone with access to one of the nodes on the
network that passes it along. At a given moment, this would
include anyone with access to the router you’re connected
to and the Internet service provider that links that router to
the wider Web. Though questionable, “sniffing” packets on
the broader Web is more than possible.36
36AT&T
willing to
spy for NSA,
MPAA, and
RIAA, Nate
Anderson.
Arstechnica,
6/13/07
Wireless-level Security
In practice, using an unsecured wireless network is somewhat
analogous to shouting your order across a crowded restaurant
rather than waiting for someone to come and take your order
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at your table. What you’re sending and receiving can be
heard by anyone in the room who chooses to listen: Your
device is speaking in a language that anyone can understand.
An unse-
cured wireless
connection
means other
devices can
easily “over-
hear” the data
your device
sends and
receives.
In a secure connection, however, communication begins
with a kind of one-to-one greeting process. Your device iden-
tifies the router and sends it a short message, indicating that
you would like to connect. The router then replies to your
message with a randomly generated nonsense string that
both devices will use as the basis for a kind of elaborate Pig
Latin in which all of your messages will be exchanged from
that point on. Thus, while your device is still sending all its
messages across the room, those messages are protected in
such a way that only your device and the router can “hear”
what is being sent.37
37 “WPA2
enterprise” se-
curity is most
robust; though
“WPA2 home”
has some vul-
nerabilities,
both are far
preferable to
an unsecured
network.
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In a secure
connection,
the messages
that devices
exchange with
the router are
protected.
Small s, Big Significance
When it comes to connecting to a website, one also has the
choice between a secure and an insecure connection. At any
given moment you can tell which type of connection you
are using simply by looking at the url bar of your browser
window–the location will start with either http or https. The
significant difference between these two lies in the little s at
the end of the second; it stands for “secure.”
What does it mean for your connection to a website to be
secure? In effect, it is much the same as in the case of the
wireless connection described above: A secured connection
means that the information you are sending back and forth
to that website is encoded in such a way that your messages
look like gibberish to anyone observing.
At the same time, there is an important difference be-
tween communicating with a router that is in the same room
as you are (or very nearby) and communicating with a web-
site that may be on the other side of the world. In a coffee
shop or library, there is almost always a third party–a per-
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son, maybe a sign–that provides the name of the network
you should connect to, and (if it is secure) its password.
Though most of us assume this information is correct if we’re
able to successfully connect to the Internet, our decision to
use that network also implies a good deal of trust: We trust
that the router is properly secured, and even that it is the
router it claims to be. If we are familiar with the business
or organization we may not give this a second thought, in
the same way that we routinely trust waiters and salespeople
not to abuse our credit card information. Yet it is important
to remember that this expression of trust is implicit in our
decision to connect.
On the broader Web, we also need someone to vouch for
the fact that the website we’re connecting to is actually
the one we think it is, because it’s also incredibly easy to
make one website look like another. In fact, even if you type
the URL of the website you want to visit directly into your
browser’s url bar, it’s possible to end up at a website that
only looks like the one you intended to visit. This is also
how some Internet censorship is implemented,38 as was seen38 Internet
Censorship by
DNS Injection,
Anonymous.
ACM SIG-
COMM,
(42)(3), 7/12
recently in Turkey.
Websites are actually located via IP address, not URL.
When you enter a URL in a browser, its IP address gets
looked up like a telephone number: by matching the URL
“name” to the IP “number.” In this case, your browser checks
the given URL with each of its Domain Name Servers (DNS).
An incorrect or malicious DNS, however, can match your
URL to the wrong IP address.
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So how can you be sure that the secure connection you
establish is to the website you’re actually looking for? In
practice this is made possible by the fact that https connec-
tions don’t just establish secure communications willy-nilly.
Before agreeing to encode your communications with a web-
site, your browser first asks it for identification, in the form
of a security certificate. These certificates work something
like digital passports for the Web. They are issued by certifi-
cate authorities which generally provide them after running
a kind of background check on the website, making sure that
it is actually owned by the company or individual who claims
to run it.39 Before agreeing to establish a secure connec-
39Make
HTTPS and
Email More
Secure, Peter
Eckersley.
EFF, 11/18/11
tion to a website via https, your browser asks the site for
this “passport,” and then checks with the issuing authority
to make sure it is authentic. If the credentials check out, This part of
the process is
known as “au-
thentication.”
your browser moves on to the next step and actually estab-
lishes an encrypted connection. Otherwise, it will throw up a
warning, letting you know that something’s not right.
A valid
security cer-
tificate means
your browser
will estab-
lish a secure
and trusted
connection.
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A bad secu-
rity certificate
will cause your
browser to
throw up a
warning.
What an Authenticated, Encrypted Connection Means,
and What It Doesn’t
So let’s say that at this point you’ve connected to both a
router and a website securely. Does that mean that no one
can see what you’re doing on the Web? Not quite. Remem-
ber that the information you send to and from that website
still has to find its way from your device to the website and
back again. To do this, every node along the route needs
access to some information about your messages in order
make sure they get to where they’re going. This is where our
metadata comes back into play: Every node on the network
still needs to know where each message is coming from and
where it’s going. In this sense, your encrypted Web traffic
is something like mail in a very sturdy envelope; anyone can
see where it’s coming from and when, as well as where it’s
going. But only your device and the website you’re commu-
nicating with can open the envelope to see what’s inside.
By contrast, if you connect to a website via http, it’s more
like sending your information via hundreds of postcards; not
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only can every node that handles it see where it is coming
from and where it is going, the contents of your messages are
there for anyone to read as well.
An http
connection
leaves all the
contents of
your packets
visible to
anyone on the
network.
This is why using https connections is so important, es-
pecially when you are sending sensitive information like
usernames and passwords. The same goes for any website
where you might enter financial, medical or personally iden-
tifying information. In spite of this, many websites that ask
for and deal with sensitive information don’t always require
or provide https connections. Until very recently, for exam-
ple, Yahoo did not require an https connection to log in to
its mail service.40 Ideally, one would use https connections 40Yahoo fi-
nally enables
HTTPS en-
cryption for
email by de-
fault, Liam
Tung. ZDNet,
1/8/14
as much as possible. Fortunately, however, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation recently launched a project aptly named
HTTPSEverywhere, a free browser plugin that always at-
tempts to make a secure connection, and then only revert to
an insecure one if the former is unavailable. Installing this
on your browsers can help make using the most secure con-
nection available a more seamless part of your Web browsing
activity.
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An https
connection,
meanwhile,
protects the
contents. Only
the meta-
data remains
visible.
Beyond the Exchange: Data Security in the Cloud
Understanding Email
Thinking of messages sent over http as postcards and those
sent via https as letters in envelopes is actually a fairly good
analogy for how your information is and isn’t exposed when
you’re actively sending messages to and from a website. But
what about after that exchange has ended? At least some of
the information we exchange with websites–be they financial
websites, social networking services, or email providers–ends
up being stored by them for various purposes. Obviously,
any website that requires a username and password will
need to store those in order to protect your account. Social
networking services host copies of our posts and photos; fi-
nancial institutions retain records of our accounts and trans-
actions. Email providers that offer Web-based email access
maintain copies of our emails.
While all of this is to be expected, the way this informa-
tion is treated, both legally and technically, may not always
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meet our expectations. For example, it is generally regarded
as good practice to store passwords only in encrypted form
in case of a security breach, though leak incidents demon-
strate that not all service providers adhere to this security
rule of thumb.41 41 42 million
unencrypted
passwords
leaked from
Cupid Me-
dia, Darlene
Storm. Com-
puter World,
11/20/13
To protect your information from outside attackers, finan-
cial institutions and email providers also typically encrypt
the copies they maintain of your account information and
emails. At the same time, these companies have the ability
to decrypt your information as well; if they didn’t, opening
an email on the Web would only reveal encrypted gibber-
ish, rather than the readable text of the note that your best
friend sent you this morning. Obviously, this is part of what Google’s recent
“end-to-end”
offering may
address some
of these issues,
but further
analysis is
needed to
assess exactly
how the
library works.
makes Web-based email services so convenient–we can read
and refer to our email from anywhere.
The flip side of this convenience, however, is that your
email provider has as much capacity as you do to access
the readable text of the note your friend sent to you. If
their servers are successfully hacked, the attacker will be
able read all of your emails as well. Perhaps more likely–
though arguably equally problematic–there are many cases
where your email provider may be compelled to use its access
to provide the text of your email messages to requesting
authorities.42 This capacity can also be leveraged by law 42 Snowden’s
E-Mail
Provider
Defied FBI De-
mands to Turn
Over Crypto
Keys, Kevin
Poulsen.
Wired,
10/2/13
enforcement to compel an email provider to decrypt and
share emails and other information that is more than 180
days old, because these are considered “abandoned” and so
can be legally obtained through a subpoena–contents and all
(18 U.S.C. 2703(a)).
Understanding Endpoints
Even without recurring headlines of cybercrime, attacks
on Web servers, and security breaches, it probably seems
commonsensical that businesses would use encryption to
protect the data they store. After all, a bank’s website is
as obvious a target for a criminal attack as a brick-and-
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mortar branch would be; perhaps even more so given that
it can be accessed from anywhere and is likely a conduit to
a much greater volume of assets. Not encrypting sensitive
organization and customer information would be an obvious
security hole.
But the data on your computer doesn’t need to be a
gateway to millions of dollars in order to have value to an
attacker. Journalists and those close to them may be the tar-
geted for the information that their devices contain about
both sources and stories: contact lists, interview notes,
source documents, etc. Even for non-journalists, gaining
access to your device can be valuable to the authorities or
a criminal seeking information, since many of us store pass-
words or sensitive financial and medical information on our
computers and phones.
In security-speak, an “endpoint” is any device that stores
information. In this sense, Web-service providers’ servers
are endpoints; so is your laptop or mobile phone. Protecting
them generally requires following some simple rules: Don’t
leave them in a situation where others can gain physical ac-
cess to them; and to be on the safe side, encrypt them. We
are apart from our devices more than we may readily imag-
ine, whether to use the bathroom at a coffee shop or pass
through a security checkpoint at an airport. Probably the
most common and high-profile example of the latter situa-
tion was exemplified when Glenn Greenwald’s partner, David
Miranda, flew through London Heathrow Airport in August
of 2013; his computers and hard drives were taken from him
for several hours.43 Any unencrypted information they con-43David
Miranda:“They
said I would
be put in jail”,
Jonathan
Watts. The
Guardian,
8/19/13
tained would have been readily accessible to authorities. Just
because you have a password on your computer or phone
doesn’t mean its contents are encrypted; this is something
you need to set up explicitly.
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Don’t Get “Pwned”
That said, encryption will not protect your data against ma-
licious software that you have voluntarily (if unknowingly)
loaded onto your device yourself. This most commonly hap- The
term“pwn”
(pronounced
p’ōn) derives
either from
World of
Warcraft or
chess.
pens through USB drives and downloads, both of which may
contain hidden programs designed to access, manipulate,
and/or communicate your private information whenever
you next connect to the Internet. Trusting the source of
the device or document isn’t enough to protect you. Brand-
new USB drives have been known to have malware embed-
ded by their manufacturers, and documents that can run
programs–such as PDFS–may contain malware of which even
the sender is unaware. This doesn’t mean that working with
these resources is impossible, but it does require taking some
simple precautions. One such approach is opening poten-
tially problematic filetypes in a service like Google Docs first;
these services are built to scan for and eliminate malware.
Another approach is to set up an “air gapped” computer,
which is simply an old machine that you never let connect to
a network. This way, any malicious software is starved of the
connection it needs to leak information. Of course, the first
option only makes sense if the information is not sensitive;
anything you save to Google Docs (or a similar Web-based
service provider) falls under the same legal and technical
rules of access as those described for email above.
The Strategies: Source Protection
and Digital Security
Preface: Beware the Buzzwords
Since the Snowden revelations of 2013, a seemingly endless
supply of app developers and service providers has emerged
onto the online landscape promising “private,” “anony-
mous,” and/or “secure” communications. Despite the recent
SnapChat settlement,44 however, companies’ use of these 44 Snapchat
Settles FTC
Charges, FTC,
5/8/14
terms is unregulated and the terms themselves are generally
poorly defined.45
45Whistleblowers
Beware: Apps
Will Rat You
Out, Andy
Greenberg.
Wired,
5/14/14
Yet in order to meaningfully protect our digital communi-
cations, clarifying the nuances of these terms is essential. We
began that process in an earlier section, where we exposed
the legal concept of privacy to be importantly limited to,
among other things, information that has not been shared in
any way with a third party.
“Anonymity,” meanwhile, is a word that is often used
as a catchall to describe communications that may, in
reality, be anonymous, pseudonymous, or simply unpub-
lished. In journalism, citing “anonymous” sources is usually
“a last resort”46, but such sources are typically anything
46The Dis-
connect on
Anonymous
Sources, Mar-
garet Sullivan.
The New
York Times,
10/12/13but: Their physical and/or legal identities are likely well-
known to the reporters and editors with whom they work.
“Pseudonymity,” meanwhile, describes any handle other than
our direct physical or legal identity. In this sense, all digital
communications are technically pseudonymous, whether or
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not we generally think of them as such. Pseudonyms may
be persistent or one-time use; an email address of your le-
gal name is a pseudonym as much as a throwaway Reddit
account. As we will see, however, the most important charac-
teristic of an effective pseudonym, for journalists and sources,
is whether or not it is linkable to its user’s physical or legal
identity.
The concept of linkability is crucial precisely because, as
discussed above, it is what undermines the practical value
of most current shield protections for journalists. Though
the concept of source protection is often thought of as not
“naming” your source, the reality is that the defaults on
most email, chat, text, and telephone systems do exactly
that with every exchange through the digital traces these
activities leave behind. The metadata records stored by
service providers can so efficiently link journalists to their
sources that the authorities need rarely make the effort to
take journalists to court. This means that where protectingThough in
Risen’s case
the govern-
ment argued
that “[n]o
other person
can [identify]
Sterling as
the individual
who disclosed
the national
defense in-
formation”,
Risen’s grand
jury subpoena
was quashed
precisely be-
cause many
metadata
records already
linked him to
Sterling.
the identity of a source is truly necessary, it is essential that
these communications be unlinkable.
As we will see below, effective use of pseudonyms is an es-
sential component of achieving unlinkability. Yet pseudonyms
themselves present something of a conundrum: How can we
know who really “owns” a particular digital identity? This
fundamental issue is one of the reasons that so many of us
have rushed to “claim” the email addresses comprised of our
legal names on major service providers, and why many orga-
nizations follow a simple firstname[dot]lastname[at] pattern
when generating email addresses as well. These practices
recognize the problems of authentication and verification -
determining who “owns” an email address or telephone num-
ber. While we often assume that an email address made up
of someone’s legal name belongs to them, in reality we also
take steps to verify digital contact information, though often
without thinking about it: Someone gives us their email ad-
dress at an event, and we continue the in-person conversation
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digitally; we call a phone number we’ve been given and the
voice that answers sounds like our friend or colleague; we
arrange to meet someone via chat and the person we expect
shows up at the right place and time. In each case, we use
some kind of non-digital communication to verify that the
person using the email address, telephone number or chat
handle is the same person who provided it to us. In the dig-
ital world, this is often described as “out of channel” or “out
of band” verification, and it’s an important aspect of using
all digital pseudonyms, including the “public keys” that we
will discuss below. The complement to this process, mean-
while, is authentication, where someone proves to us–through
their physical self or voice–that they are who they claim to
be. If authenticating a person’s identity ourselves isn’t possi-
ble, then we have to rely on the word of someone we trust.
Of course, the easiest part of protecting our information–
whether it’s footage, photographs, notes or a source list–is
through a strong password practice. As we’ll see in more
detail below, the simplest way to do this is simply to stop
thinking password and start thinking passphrase. This makes
for logins that are both easier to remember and harder to
crack.
Protecting Your Sources, Protecting Yourself
At the heart of most U.S. shield protections for journalists is
a simple premise: If journalists cannot protect their sources,
it substantially harms their ability to obtain the information
they need to hold government accountable–perhaps the fun-
damental objective of a free and independent press. Given
the current legal and technical realities, however, journal-
ists who communicate with their sources digitally may be
rendering these protections essentially moot. In practice
the defaults on most email, chat, text, and telephone sys-
tems effectively identify our sources with every exchange, so
protecting them means successfully scattering these digital
traces so they cannot be used to connect the dots.
54 COLUMBIA JOURNALISM SCHOOL | TOW CENTER FOR DIGITAL JOURNALISM
Of course, we work with many sources whose connection
to us can be, and is, acceptably known, through long associ-
ation or publication. Yet communication with these sources
needs protecting too. As every journalist knows, sources
sometimes don’t appreciate the implications of the informa-
tion they share; ensuring confidentiality of their communica-
tions with us is an important part of source protection even
if their identity is public.
Because of this, you’ll find the content below broken
broadly into two sections: strategies for protected but link-
able communications, followed by strategies for unlinkable
communications. First, however, we’ll address the three main
methods of digital information protection: encryption, obfus-
cation, and deletion.
Encryption
Put simply, encryption is the process of scrambling or en-
coding messages in such a way that only someone with the
correct “key” can unlock or unscramble the original.
In digital communications, there are two primary types
of encryption: symmetric and asymmetric. In symmetric
encryption, a single, secret key is used to both encrypt and
decrypt a message. This approach is strong and fast, but
requires that sender and recipient somehow agree on–and
securely share–a single secret key. Symmetric encryption has
been used for thousands of years and, at its heart, is very
similar to the kinds of alphabetic substitutions that you
might find on a decoder ring.
Asymmetric encryption, on the other hand, works by
generating a mathematically related “public-private” key
pair. Though each key can decode a message encrypted by
the other, the two keys are asymmetric in the sense that the
public key can be generated from the private key, but not
the reverse. How is this possible? Asymmetric encryption
takes advantage of the fact that it is generally much easier to
mix things together than it is derive the original components
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from the finished product. For example, it is easy to create
some color of green paint by mixing together yellow and
blue. But the only way to tell what proportion of yellow and
blue paints went into making a particular shade of green is
through a long and arduous process of trial and error.
In mathematics, multiplication is fast, but factoring is
time-consuming–even for a computer. The only way to find
the factors of a number is to work your way up the num-
ber line, testing every possibility as you go. Public-private
key pairs are based on this principle: The private key con-
sists of a unique set of factors that when multiplied together
yield the public key. Use enough factors–preferably prime
numbers–in your private key, and it would take today’s com-
puters decades or more to derive the private key from the
public one.
These special properties of public-private key pairs let
us do things with them that we cannot do with symmetric
keys. For example, we can (as the name suggests) make the
public key public, and claim it openly on the Web. Anyone
who wants to send us an encrypted message can encode it
with our public key, knowing that only the owner of the
private key can decode it. Likewise, by sharing a message
encoded with our private key, we let others verify that the
public key we have indicated truly belongs to us. Of course,
knowing that a person controls a particular key pair doesn’t
actually tell you who they are. That step–confirming the
“real” identity of the person who controls a particular key–is
known as authentication.
For individuals, authentication can be done by securely
sharing the hash (sometimes also called called a “finger-
print”) of your public key. Most simply, this can be done in A typical PGP
hash is 32
characters
long.
person, via business card or QR code. Voice authentication
is also a good option, since we tend to recognize individuals’
voices. Even postal mail can be an option, if you’re confi-
dent about where to physically reach the person with whom
you’re trying to communicate. For websites, third parties
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vouch for the legitimacy of a public key by “signing” (or
authenticating) it with their own. This is the equivalent of
believing your friend when he or she gives you someone’s
email address.
In practice, virtually all digital encryption systems are
hybrid systems: They use both symmetric and asymmetric
encryption. Typically, this means encrypting the actual
message with a unique symmetric key, and then encrypting
the symmetric key itself with the appropriate public key
and transmitting it with the message. This is the process
that underlies both secure (https) Internet connections and
encrypted email .A website’s
“security
certificate” is
just another
name for its
public key.
There are cases, however, where no already-known “pub-
lic key” is available to encrypt that symmetric key; when
connecting to a wireless router, for example, or using many
secure chat programs. For these, keys must be generated and
exchanged on the fly, using a process called Diffie-Hellman
key exchange. Despite the fact the fact that the first mes-For a helpful
demonstration
of this type of
exchange, see
Chris Bishop’s
segment for
the Royal
Institution
Christmas
Lectures
sages are exchanged “in the clear,” this process makes it
possible for both devices to derive the same shared secret
key.
There is a vulnerability here, of course. How does one
know that the first message really came from the person you
think it did? If you had a public key to compare it to, it
would be easy to check. Without this, however, it is possible
that a third party could intercept your communications and
impersonate each side to the other–all the while decrypting
and reading all of the messages you exchange. This is known
as the “Man in the Middle” (MITM) attack.
Fortunately, the MITM attack is simple to thwart: Simply
telephone the person with whom you are chatting to verify
that your secret keys match (many programs will display
them on screen), or exchange it via encrypted email (pro-
vided you’ve already or authenticated that the public key you
have really belongs to them). After that, you can chat with
confidence.
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Obfuscation
Obfuscation is exactly what it sounds like: digitally “hid-
ing” information, whether it’s data stored on your computer
or your IP address on the Internet. Some forms of obfusca-
tion also provide “plausible deniability”; in other words, the
reasonable appearance that nothing is being hidden.
In general, obfuscation is difficult to do on one’s own;
its effectiveness depends primarily on your data’s ability to
“blend in.” For example, using “hidden volumes” to make an
archive of sensitive documents look like a movie file works
best if you have a reasonable number of movie files on your
computer. That way, the chances of an attacker locating the
one that is not actually a movie is much lower. Similarly,
using a VPN or Tor to mask the geographic origin of your
Internet traffic (addressed shortly) works best if there are
many other users on the same system. In this sense, obfus-
cation can be best understood as a kind of herd protection,
much like digital security in general. The bigger the crowd
your data or operations can blend into, the more difficult it
makes you and your sources to target.
One of the common challenges to the suggestion that more
people use encryption is that there are environments where it
makes one stand out, and thus a target for greater scrutiny.
There are many cases where this is true. Obfuscation is
exactly the principle of “security by obscurity,” which may
actually mean forgoing encryption in certain contexts.
Deletion
Ultimately, no kind of search can expose information you
don’t have, both for individuals and service providers. Reg-
ularly and securely deleting unnecessary emails and files,
especially from hosted services, is a simple and effective pro-
tection against having your data rifled through either by
the authorities or by hackers. Think of this as cleaning out
your file cabinet on a regular basis: Do it once every three
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months to help keep your exposure in check. And rememberRecall that
the contents
of emails over
180 days old
may be subject
to subpoena,
so doing this
every six
months is a
minimum.
that simply “trashing” your information isn’t enough. Online
you’ll need to “delete forever,” and on your computer you’ll
want to use a tool like CCleaner to truly overwrite “deleted”
files so the data can’t be retrieved.
When Linkability is Acceptable
In the bulk of day-to-day journalism, source linkability is not
a paramount concern. We tend to prefer our sources “on the
record” in the first place, and once quoted in an article their
connection to us is public–and published–knowledge.
At the same time, concision isn’t the only reason we don’t
publish entire interview transcripts. Most source conversa-
tions contain a mix of “on” and “off the record” remarks;
not everything we discover in an interview should be dis-
coverable. Yet if these exchanges take place through (un-
encrypted) email, shared documents, or chat applications,
“discoverable”–both legally and technically–is exactly what
they are.
As in the physical world, no digital security measure is ab-
solute, and ultimately the onus falls on individual journalist
or organization to determine which measures should be base-
line and which applied only in certain cases. Whatever the
decision, however, its consequences will most substantially
be borne by your source, not yourself. A situation need not
be life-threatening to be a significant risk: Loss of a job or
professional standing, family and marital consequences, fi-
nancial and/or legal liabilities can all be the fallout of source
communications coming to light. In the majority of cases,
the risk you take is not your own.
“We’re allowed to make choices about risks to ourselves, not
our sources.”
–Jonathan Stray
The Strategies: Source Protection and Digital Security 59
Encrypt to Protect
The main key to protecting your communications with
known sources is simple: Encrypt, encrypt, encrypt.47 Where 47 Privacy
Tools: Encrypt
What You
Can, Julia
Angwin.
ProPublica,
5/6/14
encryption isn’t possible for legal, technical, or resource rea-
sons, consider communication alternatives that may be more
familiar to your correspondents or have better legal protec-
tions, such as postal mail.
No matter the communication method, there is a good
range of solutions out there for all kinds of devices. Android
devices tend to have a greater variety of open-source options,
but there are several trusted cryptographers making solu-
tions for Apple devices as well. In general, authentication
and encryption require that both parties use the partic-
ular app in question; this can made Web-based solutions
like CryptoCat valuable for journalists trying to move their
sources to more secure communications channels, since only a
browser plug-in is required.48
48Crypto for
the Masses,
Quinn Norton.
The Daily
Beast, 5/12/14
Web Browsing
If you’ve ever worked in a large organization, chances are
you’ve had to use a “virtual private network,” or VPN at
one point or another. VPNs funnel all of your Web traffic
through an encrypted tunnel into the network for which
they are configured. This provides two types of protection
for Web activity, in that it both encrypts your traffic and
obfuscates its origin, by sending it first to your organiza-
tion’s network–wherever in the world that is–and then out
to the broader Internet, no matter where you are. Using
your company VPN or a similar commercial solution like Pri-
vate Internet Access or TorGuard to route your Web traffic
through a known network can help protect you from a poten-
tially hostile Web provider.49 Keep in mind, however, that
49 Five Best
VPN Service
Providers,
Alan Henry.
LifeHacker,
3/23/14
while the ISP you’re on will only know that you’re using a
VPN, your company or VPN provider will be able to see all
of the Web requests you make. An IPsec VPN will route not
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just your browser traffic but all of your Web traffic (e.g. for
applications like DropBox etc.) through the VPN.
To truly anonymize the location of your Web browsing
activity, however, the Tor Browser Bundle is your best bet.
The Tor Browser is an open-source, cross-platform browser,
described in more detail below, that is an important tool for
anonymizing your location online, especially in places where
VPNs may be banned outright.
Email
Email presents a special security problem for a number of
reasons, but the first step you can take is not to store your
emails on any Web server longer than necessary. Set up a
local email application like the free, open-source and cross-
platform Thunderbird on your computer and connect it
to your regular email account. Even if you don’t use the
application much on a day-to-day basis, you can use it to
follow a “download-and-delete” protocol where every three
months or so, you download all of your emails that are more
than a few months old and archive them locally. After you’ve
backed them up to an external hard drive, delete the copies
on your Web-based email provider. You will still be able to
save and search your old emails, but since they reside on
your own physical computer, they will be better protected
against subpoena-based searches.
Thunderbird also provides support for encrypting and au-
thenticating email, through its Enigmail add-on and GPG.
GPG (GnuPri-
vacy Guard)
is the open-
source ver-
sion of PGP
(“Pretty Good
Privacy”),
which was
created by Phil
Zimmerman.
While setting up some of these systems can take several
steps, once you’ve generated your public-private key pairFor more
information
on working
with GPG, see
the GPG Mini
How To
and connected it to your email application, all of this hap-
pens in the background. The software can store the public
keys of your correspondents, and performs the necessary en-
cryption/decryption and signing of your messages with the
click of a button. Though Google recently announced an
“end-to-end” encryption option for Gmail, the fact that it’s
still decrypted in the browser makes it less private than op-
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tions like Enigmail, where the only decrypted version exists
on your physical computer.
Chat
There is a range of encrypted chat tools for both desktop
and mobile that can be used with your existing services (e.g.,
GoogleTalk) while still encrypting and authenticating your
conversations. Adium for Mac and Jitsi for PC are open
Adium also
lets you man-
age contacts
for multiple
chat services
through a sin-
gle interface.
source and work with most major chat services. CryptoCat,
meanwhile, is both open source and Web-based, requiring
only a simple plugin installation.
On mobile, ChatSecure for Android works with GoogleTalk.
SilentCircle and Wickr , have apps for both Android and Phil Zim-
merman is
a founder of
Silent Circle.
Noted security
researcher Dan
Kaminsky
and Whitfield
Diffie are
advisors to
Wickr.
iPhone that support encrypted chat as well as encrypted text
messaging and voices calls with other users of the app.
Text Messaging
A good Android solution for texts communications is TextSe-
cure, which supports message-level encryption and authen-
tication and also encrypts the texts stored on your phone.
SilentCircle and Wickr, mentioned above, also offer en-
crypted text messaging.
Voice
Encrypted voice and video communication over the Web
depend on secure “SIP” services, such as those supported
SIP, or “Ses-
sion Initiation
Protocol” is
similar to http,
but used for
exchanging
multimedia
and voice data
over the Web.
Just as secure
Web connec-
tions need to
be https, a
secure SIP ser-
vice is required
for encrypted
voice services.
by ostel.co or linphone.org, which can handle these more
complex data streams. When used with these services, Jitsi
supports encrypted voice calls from PCs, while OSTel does
the same for Android devices via the CsipSimple service.
SilentCircle and Wickr offer encrypted voice call support.
RedPhone also provides an encrypted-voice option, but relies
on your existing phone number, so should not be used where
unlinkability is required.
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Where Unlinkability Is A Necessity
Creating unlinkable digital communications first requires
understanding what our digital communications networks
see, as was discussed in detail in the previous section. The
next step is to evaluate exactly what level of unlinkability
a given situation requires. Is it important that the source
not be linked to a particular journalist, or is it dangerous for
the source to be seen communicating with any journalist at
all? Is having this person remain truly anonymous–meaning
his or her physical and/or legal identity is unknown even to
the reporter–an option, either technically or journalistically
speaking? What are the physical, technical, legal, financial,
and expertise constraints of both parties?
The next step is to consider the data streams that can
be used to connect our digital activity to our real identities.
Our Web browsers and even operating systems are littered
with flecks of digital DNA; accounts that require logins–
like email, social networks and online marketplaces–tether
these digital identities to our physical identities through
recognizable handles and financial details. Our network
connection points are often linked to our physical selves as
students, cable account holders, and employees.
Creating unlinkable communications, then, means creating
an environment where these traces are either eliminated
or obfuscated, from our operating systems up through our
online accounts. Fortunately, some good, open-source tools
exist that can be composed along with some solid strategies
to make this feasible.
Unlinkable Web Browsing: Tails + Tor
Tails
The simplest way to make sure that your computer is
“sanitized” of any identifiable digital traces is simply to do
as a doctor would: Dispose of your operating system after
every use. Though impractical for everyday tasks where
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you need to be able to regularly store, modify, and share
files, this “discard after use” approach is exactly the system
design of Tails–a Linux-based operating system that lives on
a USB drive and can be run directly from that drive on any
computer available. When the computer is restarted, Tails
starts up only in the host machine’s random access memory
(RAM) and deletes itself on shutdown. Because Tails is
recreated from scratch every time it is started, it can’t leak
identifying bits of digital debris when you connect to the
Internet. Ideally, you
should not
store files on
your Tails
USB drive,
with the possi-
ble exception
of your GPG
key. The Tails
documentation
provides a
good overview
of what Tails
+ Tor can and
cannot protect.
Tor
Unfortunately, the mechanics of the Internet require that
a fair amount of identifying information be attached to our
digital communications, simply in order to function. In some
ways the most stubborn of these identifiers is our IP address,
which maps to the physical location of our Internet connec-
tion. While it may be easy to imagine creating “throwaway”
email accounts to use with a source, influencing IP addresses
seems generally beyond our control.
Enter Tor, or “the onion router.” Best known for its well-
used (and very usable) browser, Tor is a combination of
special Internet nodes (“relays”) and software designed to
effectively mask the IP address of your Internet traffic. It ac-
complishes this by wrapping each packet of your Web traffic–
including its “to” and “from” metadata–in three successive
layers of encryption; it then hands off these encryption-
wrapped packets to its exclusive network.
Your packets then move across three nodes in the Tor
network, each of which has the ability to “peel off” exactly
one layer of encryption; by the time your data reaches the
final “exit” node–whose IP address it will take on–it has
been “unwrapped” to its original state and can make its way
on the open Web just as it would with your regular Internet
connection. The result is that, to outside observers, your
Web traffic seems to be coming from an IP address (and
therefore physical location) other than your own.
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Tor is designed not only to protect your data from be-
ing traced by outside parties, but also from monitoring by
the Tor network itself. Not only is your content encrypted,
but each node only knows the location of the immediately
previous node in the Tor communication chain. In addition
to this, Tor cycles the set of relays your traffic uses approx-
imately every 10 minutes, so that analyzing your pattern
of Internet traffic for other identifying information is more
difficult to do.For more
detail, see the
Tor overview While Tor is often described as an “anonymity” network,it offers a very particular type of anonymity: locational
anonymity for your Web traffic, nothing more. While it does
this very well, using Tor does not obfuscate what you are
doing on the Web, only where you are doing it from. If you
log-in to Facebook–or Google or Yahoo or Twitter or what
have you–those services will still have records of your activ-
ity as they always would; it’s just that the IP address they
see won’t match where you really are. Likewise, using Tor
Browser doesn’t automatically protect you from cookie-based
tracking; you need to make sure that cookies are turned off.
Two final points about Tor: The addresses of Tor relays
are not secret. In fact, having them known is part of what
makes it possible to perform checkups that assure the net-
work isn’t compromised. This does mean, however, that
anyone observing your Web traffic will know that you’re us-
ing Tor, either because they see your traffic going in to a
known Tor relay or coming out of a known exit node. There
is nothing illegal about using Tor. In fact, the more that
people use Tor for regular Web browsing, the better its ob-
fuscation properties work. That said, depending on where
you are, connecting to the Tor network may make your Web
traffic stand out. If you think the network operator (or the
state) may be watching your traffic, using Tor may not be a
good idea. Remember, all security is situationally dependent;
there is no substitute for knowing your context.
Second, Tor is a low-latecy (i.e. minimal-delay) network,
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meaning it passes your packets back and forth as quickly as
possible. While this is part of what makes it a viable alterna- “Mix-nets” are
high-latency
networks
that send
out messages
in batches,
making it
difficult to
identify their
destination.
tive to more mainstream browsers like Firefox and Chrome,
it does mean that someone watching both your IP address
and the correct exit node stands a good chance of being able
to connect it back to you. Although your connection going
into the Tor network is encrypted, if this encryption were
penetrated, experiments have shown that over time someone
watching both the entering and exiting streams of traffic
could statistically connect the two. However, because this
type of traffic analysis is at least legally restricted in many
places this risk is most salient when you are on a private
and/or state-controlled (e.g., company, university and some
national) network.50
50Harvard
Student Re-
ceives F For
Tor Failure,
Runa A. Sand-
vik. Forbes,
12/18/13
Unlinkable Email: Keep Your Pseudonyms Isolated
Any time you communicate with a source via email or
chat, you are both necessarily communicating either with a
pseudonym which may or may not be linkable to your “real,”
or physical, identity. In some cases, it may be important
that both you and your source use unlinkable pseudonyms;
this will help protect your sources in the case that being
known to communicate with a journalist (or with you specif-
ically) may put them at risk. If this is not the case, however,
it may be sufficient for your source to use an unlinkable
email address or handle for a particular exchange.
In order for unlinkable email to work, the address or han-
dle itself must be created in an unlinkable context (e.g.
an email account that you create and access only via Tor
Browser), and you must both be vigilant not to include
identifying information in the account details, or share any
information that might connect the account to real indi-
viduals or locations. This means not discussing anything
personally identifying: physical location, local stores, work-
place name, or friend or family connections. Remember that
Lantanya
Sweeney’s
foundational
work on
identifiability
demonstrated
that 87% of
Americans
could be
identified by
a combination
of zip code,
gender and
date of birth.
unless the contents of your chat or email are encrypted, this
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information could be accessed by third parties (e.g., your
email provider or law enforcement) and used to connect these
communications to your real identities.
Likewise, your unlinkable identities themselves cannot
be exchanged via any linkable communication channel (e.g.,
unencrypted, linkable email or chat accounts). You must
agree upon and exchange these identities by some means
outside of the communication channel you wish to use. In-
person exchanges are best, human networks (trusted mutual
acquaintances), voice conversations (for an existing source),
and physical mail exchanges are also reasonable options. You
Postal mail
services are
a viable op-
tion for many
reasons: the
physical & le-
gal protections
are better,
as is the ob-
fuscation - a
great deal of
postal mail
still moves
through the
system each
day.
will have to judge which of these is the best approach for a
given situation on a case-by-case basis.
Unlinkable Chat
Unlinkability in synchronous (real-time) communications
like chat is easier than with asynchronous communications
like email; it actually has the potential for perfect forward
secrecy. A chat service used with an unlinkable handle that
is accessed on a Tails computer and/or through Tor Browser
is particularly robust. Any of the encrypted-chat applications
mentioned above can be used in this environment, though
ones like CryptoCat, which don’t require saving any informa-
tion to Tails, are preferable in these instances.
Unlinkable Text
Many encrypted text programs actually use your mobile
phone’s data connection to send messages, but most of them
read your contact information and will (necessarily) show
the phone number of the sender and recipient along with the
message. While TextSecure supports perfect forward secrecy,
chat is often a better option for unlinkable exchanges.
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Unlinkable Voice
As with text, encrypted voice calls are actually carried over
your data connection. Apps like OSTel use a number dif-
ferent than your regular phone number, as do apps like
SilentCircle and Wickr. Though some reporters may use
so-called “burner phones,” obtaining and using any kind of
mobile device in such a way that it cannot be connected to
your identity is nearly impossible. Stick with computer-based
voice calls or go back to good old-fashioned postal mail.
Protecting Your Keys and Accounts
Creating unlinkable email accounts, verifying pseudonyms,
and using encryption to protect your communications doesn’t
do any good if your accounts get hacked or someone gets
access to your private key, which is why the heart of all good
security practice is the use of strong, unique passwords on all
your accounts and on the software that protects your private
key.
On its surface, this recommendation seems simple enough,
and it’s advice that most of us have heard before. But in
practice, it presents two primary problems. First, what is a
“strong” password? Where guidance is offered (often along
the lines of “must include at least one number and one up-
percase letter”), the results are often difficult to remember
and the actual “strength” is not clear. Meanwhile, sites
that grade the quality of the passwords we create are of-
ten opaque about how to create good ones. In this scenario,
we’re lucky to remember what we typed by the time our
entry receives a strong grade.
Fortunately, these issues have both digital and analog so-
lutions, and you can mix and match the strategies according
to your preference. Since at least some situations, however,
will require that you remember your password, we’ll start
with simple recommendations for creating strong and memo-
rable passwords.
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Forget Password; Remember Passphrase
The strength of a password comes is determined by two at-
tributes: its length and its complexity. Length, naturally,
is the number of characters; complexity relates to the ran-
domness of those characters, in terms of both order and
type (e.g., punctuation, numbers, and uppercase characters).
Increase the strength of either (or both) characteristics of
your passwords enough, and you have a set of characters
that would take some number of centuries for a computer to
figure out.
The trouble is that increasing complexity is both hard
to do well–common number-for-letter substitutions are well
known by hackers–and makes passwords hard to remember.
Increasing length, on the other hand, is very straightforward
when you think in terms of phrases instead of words.
Take, for example, your favorite quote from a television
show or movie. This is likely to be both pretty long (in terms
of characters) and you already have it memorized. As long
its source isn’t associated with any of your digital profiles
and it isn’t a well-known “catch phrase,” it’s probably a
pretty good choice. Even better, pick a phrase or quota-
tion from your “guilty pleasure” canon–movies, television
shows or songs you don’t even like to admit you enjoy, so
that even someone close to you might not think to guess it.
Longer phrases and irregular capitalization help improve the
strength of the password, meaning it will be pretty tough to
hack programmatically, as well as hard to guess.51
51 zxcvbn:
realistic pass-
word strength
estimation,
Dan Wheeler.
DropBox,
4/10/12 Password Generators & Managers
There’s obviously no way for someone to steal a passphrase
that only lives in your memory, but trying to remember the
dozen or more we may need for all of our various devices
and accounts can still be overwhelming–leading to the risky
temptation to use the same password in multiple places.
A great way to deal with this is to use a password man-
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ager, like KeePass or LastPass, which stores your passwords
(and can also create them for you) in an encrypted file that
you unlock with a master passphrase. KeePass is open source
and can be stored on a USB key; LastPass is cloud-based but
crucially only stores the encrypted file, so the service doesn’t
have access to any of your passwords.
In some cases, even writing a passphrase down on a piece
of paper can be suitable, as long as it’s kept in a both legally
and physically secure location, like a locked drawer in your
desk at home. Obviously this limits your access to them, but
as long as the place it’s kept is yours (so it can’t be searched
without a warrant) and it’s not just lying around, this is still
a better approach than using weak passwords. Just make
sure never to carry it with you!
Protecting Your Devices & Stored Data
Generally device and data protection is achieved by thought-
fully combining three techniques: encryption, obfuscation
and deletion. Even in the case of email this triumvirate
applies. Encrypt your content with GPG, obfuscate your
location with the Tor Browser Bundle, and securely delete
the traces left by your regular activities by using a disposable
operating system like Tails.
Don’t forget
to regularly
download,
backup and
delete your
email.
Encrypt Your Devices
Encrypting your various devices is probably the easiest part.
FileVault comes bundled with Macs, and TrueCrypt is free
TrueCrypt
development
ended in May,
2014. An audit
of the code
is underway,
however, and
community
support may
continue.
and cross-platform. Both Android devices and iPhones have
built-in encryption options and can be set up in under five
minutes.
Encrypt and/or Obfuscate Groups of Files
Even beyond email, you want to make sure you encrypt and
obfuscate sensitive data stored on your computer, in case you
are compelled to decrypt it. TrueCrypt is especially good for
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this; you can use it to encrypt files on your computer and
then rename the TrueCrypt file to look like something else
entirely, like a movie file. Just make sure that the size of the
file makes sense for the “cover” you give it–a 500 MB .doc
file is pretty unlikely. While similar options don’t currently
exist for most phones, there are research and development
efforts in this area.5252CleanOS:
Limiting Mo-
bile Data Ex-
posure, Yang
Tang et al.
usenix;login;
(38)(1), 2012;
Blackphone,
The Smart-
phone That
Simplifies Pri-
vacy, Natasha
Lomas.
Techcrunch,
2/26/14
If you are traveling, consider whether you need to keep
sensitive data on your computer at all. In places with good
Internet access, services like Martus can encrypt your files
locally and store them remotely; you don’t even have to
keep the key with you if you don’t need access to them until
you get home. Likewise, if your encrypted files are small
enough, you can even transfer them to a USB drive and hide
it somewhere that it’s unlikely to be found in a search.
Don’t Forget to Delete!
Moving files to the “trash” on your computer–and even
“emptying” it–doesn’t actually do anything to destroy those
files; it simply lets the computer know that the memory they
are using can be overwritten if needed. To really destroy the
contents of a file, you need to make sure it’s overwritten, ide-
ally a few times. Tools like CCleaner will let you do exactly
that.
Metadata: More Than Just Communications
Sending data over the Web isn’t the only way our informa-
tion gets tagged with metadata. Many cameras and camera
phones attach data to photographs about the time and loca-
tion of a particular photograph, as well as the equipment on
which it was shot. This can be incredibly helpful for photo
editors, but dangerous for journalists and sources whom it
can be used to locate. Tools like InformaCam encrypts the
metadata about photos on your phone, while ObscuraCam
lets you blur out anyone (or anything) you need to. While
The Strategies: Source Protection and Digital Security 71
computer-based software to eliminate this metadata exists, a
quick-fix for posting images to the Web is simply to screen-
grab them and use the capture instead of the original.
Documents, too, tend to contain metadata about who cre-
ated them and when (often drawn from your computer user-
name or software registration information), so avoid sharing
text in formats that can contain “macros” (e.g., .doc/x or “Macro” is
another term
for a small
program.
.pdf) where possible. Likewise, do some cleanup before post-
ing any original documents given to you by a source. Some
organizations have been known to use digital “watermark-
ing” on sensitive documents to trace leakers. This can take
many forms, but can be as subtle as giving each copy of the
document slightly different typos and formatting, so that
if it appears somewhere the source can be identified. Al-
ways discuss the implications with your editor, but consider
formatting and spellchecking any source documents before
posting to eliminate these patterns.
Analog Extras
Finally, a good deal of security comes from taking simple,
physical precautions. Get a privacy screen for your laptop,
and keep an eye out for “shoulder surfers”. Put a Post-it over
your laptop and phone cameras when you’re not actively
using them, and never let your devices out of your sight or
loan them to anyone. The one exception to this may be in
cases where you are meeting a source in person: Rather than
turning your phone off, leave it at home or at work.
Looking Ahead
Source Protection and More
The primary objective of this paper has been to provide an
overview of the legal and technical infrastructure that shapes
the practical requirements for source protection in the age of
digital communications. In the preceding section, I presented
some tools and approaches for protecting source commu-
nications in the context of the two primary use cases for
journalists: linkable and unlinkable sources. While the above
discussion is not exhaustive, evaluating source communica-
tions within a framework of linkability does offer a valuable
mechanism for designing digital communication solutions for
journalists.
Integrating the strategies discussed above into the current
workflow of journalism is no small task, and the suggestion
to do so is not made lightly. I do believe, however, that this
integration is both necessary and feasible, and will outline
some possible approaches to it below. Before elaborating
on these further, however, it is worthwhile to consider some
of the additional advantages that these source-protection
methods offer to journalists and their organizations.
Verification Protects Your Reputation
Verification–the process of confirming one’s ownership of a
particular digital identity–is an essential aspect of encrypted
digital communications. But verification has an additional
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value for journalists–the ability to protect their reputations
in the case that one or more of their digital identities (e.g.,
email, Twitter, or Facebook accounts) are compromised.
Digital signatures, for example, can be attached to emails
whether they are encrypted or not, and, for all practical
purposes these signatures cannot be forged. If an account is
hacked remotely, the attacker will not be able to replicate
the digital signature, immediately tipping off any recipients
that the communication is not genuine. Likewise, one can
message essential contacts from a new account and they
will be able to confirm it is really “you” by checking the
signature.
Asymmetric Encryption Supports True Anonymity
Conversely, verification also supports the possibility of work-
ing with truly anonymous sources. Over time, the handles
and email accounts used by such a source may change, but
as long as the digital signature remains consistent, one can
be confident that the person (or, in some cases, organization)
on the other end of the exchange is the same. Moreover, aOn an organi-
zational level,
this can be
achieved by
implementing
a tool like
SecureDrop
source wishing to make secure contact can do so by encrypt-
ing a message with the journalist’s public key. This message
could be an email or even a file that the journalist is directed
to by another means. Whether sent from a throwaway email
address or posted anonymously, that information will only be
accessible to the journalist for whom it was intended.
Digital Security: A Journalistic Essential for the 21st
Century
“It should be clear that unencrypted journalist-source com-
munication is unforgivably reckless.”
–Edward Snowden5353 Edward
Snowden
Speaks to
Peter Maass,
Peter Maass.
The New York
Times, 8/8/13
As Snowden, Greenwald, and Poitras’ experiences demon-
strate, adopting robust digital security measures has largely
been the project of individual journalists and personal net-
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works. Even in large organizations, these practices are often
confined to a handful of individuals who have preexisting
technical knowledge or work with sensitive sources or mate-
rial.
This situation is inadequate for a number of reasons.
At the individual and organizational level, ad-hoc source
protection is incompatible with sensitive–and sometimes
essential–reporting. Few organizations could afford the kind
of protracted legal battle James Risen has faced, yet the
alternative is either to abandon this coverage altogether or
allow sources to wither under an atmosphere of increasingly
aggressive leak prosecutions. Moreover, those doing sensitive
reporting are not the only targets for attack; for an adver-
sary seeking to infiltrate a news organization’s network–as
experienced by Bloomberg, the The New York Times, the
Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post–any point of
entry will do. In this sense and others, digital source protec-
tion is a “herd” protection. It works best–and, arguably, only
truly works at all–if everyone is doing it.
Implementing Digital Security At Scale
Integrating digital security practices into a newsroom work-
flow will require concerted organizational effort. Editors will
need to recognize the importance of digital security in the
reporting process, and honor the scheduling implications it
may entail. Reporters will need training and technical sup-
port for new systems and software. At the highest levels,
implementing robust digital security practices will require
an institutional commitment both financially and cultur-
ally, wherein noncompliance is not tolerated and privacy and
security considerations sit at the table alongside legal and
editorial ones.
While not insurmountable, the complexities of opera-
tionalizing digital security in a newsroom are certainly real.
Likewise, it is unrealistic to expect every journalist to be-
come expert in all possible nuances of digital security prac-
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tice. Yet here is another sense in which digital security is
not sui generis. In its technical complexity and importance
to the industry, digital security is much like libel. Just as
news organizations expect that reporters and editors have a
basic literacy in libel considerations, so too should they as-
sess and/or train their reporters and editors in the essentials
of digital security. And just as news organizations retain
experts to consult on particularly thorny libel issues, they
should have experts on hand to advise on sensitive digital
security measures where needed; some organizations already
do.5454Meet the
Man Hired to
Make Sure the
Snowden Docs
Aren’t Hacked,
Lorenzo
Franceschi-
Bicchierai.
Mashable,
5/27/14
At a time when most news organizations are overstretched
and underfunded, the very idea of adding yet another step
to the reporting process or another employee to the payroll
may seem laughable, even cruel. Yet, as is often the case,
with new approaches also come new opportunities. Some of
these are financial, as I will discuss below. No less significant,
however, are the editorial opportunities. Reporters well-
versed in digital security practices will find themselves with
a new array of skills for locating and verifying sources and
stories. They may even find themselves with new sources
altogether as their networks learn of their better security
practices.
Challenges and Opportunities
in Digital Security Technologies
“‘Encryption works,’ said Snowden. The problem, in real
life, is nothing that *runs* encryption works.”
–Quinn Norton
The acknowledged usability of much digital-security soft-
ware at the moment could probably be best summarized
as “abysmal.”55 While less generally true of mobile-based
55Why King
George III
Can En-
crypt, Arvind
Narayanan.
Center for
Information
Technol-
ogy Policy,
6/10/14
offerings–such as SilentCircle, Wickr, TextSecure etc.–the
difficulty of creating keys with GPG or installing Tails on a
USB drive is still prohibitive to most users. Setting up each
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of these requires several steps and, often, some amount of
risk to the user’s computer if something goes wrong.
There are several reasons for this overall lack of usability.
First and foremost, many secure-communications projects
lack the steady revenue stream and well-defined user-base
that are prerequisite for effective usability testing and devel-
opment. Many of the tools recommended here are dependent
on periodic government grants that do not prioritize usabil-
ity, and as the recent “Heartbleed” bug illustrated, the level
of donations to even widely used security libraries is often
abysmally low.56 The result is that many of these tools are 56Tech giants
finally agree to
fund OpenSSL,
Jon Brodkin.
Arstechnica,
4/24/14
materially unusable, unstable, or unreliable– and they are
liable to disappear entirely if their funding is not renewed.
Yet it is these very challenges that also offer an oppor-
tunity for news organizations to diversify their revenue
streams. By partnering with existing projects or building
their own, large news companies can invest in the develop-
ment of secure digital tools specifically designed to meet the
needs of journalists and then sell or license those solutions to
other organizations.
To be clear, my suggestion is not that journalistic orga-
nizations begin developing the kind of “black box” software
produced by some commercial security vendors; transparency
is as essential to software development as it is to journal-
ism.57 As in journalism, transparency in digital-security 57 “Be trans-
parent” as
a guiding
journalism
principle,
Tom Rosen-
stiel. Poynter,
9/16/13
software is both an ethical and a practical concern: either
you must be able to see the code, trust the community to
validate the code, or trust the person who wrote it. If you
don’t know the code, you don’t know what it does.
Being able to “see the code,” however, does not require
that the code also be free. Though many of the security
projects listed above are both free and open source, alter-
native economic models are possible. “Source available”
software,58 for example, makes the code available for review
58 Source
Available
vs Open
Source vs
Free Software,
Phil Haack.
7/26/06
and even reuse in other open-source projects, but commer-
cial use or distribution requires a license fee; the widely used
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MySQL employs this type of dual-licensing. Alternatively, a
service-and-support model, similar to that offered by RedHat
is another possibility for generating revenue.
Engaging the Legal System
“[T]here are no comparable Federal statutory standards to
protect the privacy and security of communications trans-
mitted by new noncommon carrier communications services
or new forms of telecommunications and computer technol-
ogy. This is so, even though American citizens and Amer-
ican businesses are using these new forms of technology in
lieu of, or side-by-side with, first class mail and common
carrier telephone services…
Most importantly, the law must advance with the technol-
ogy to ensure the continued vitality of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Privacy cannot be left to depend solely on physical
protection, or it will gradually erode as technology ad-
vances. Congress must act to protect the privacy of our
citizens. If we do not, we will promote the gradual erosion
of this precious right.”
–cited in “The New Privacy Interest”5959The New
Privacy Inter-
est: Electronic
Mail, Steven
Winters.
Berkeley Tech-
nology Law
Journal (8),
1993
An ongoing issue in the privacy and security of digital
communications is the increasingly revealing nature of meta-
data and the sheer volume of data that is observable by third
parties,60 especially as location-aware mobile and embedded
60Ars tests In-
ternet surveil-
lance, Sean
Gallagher.
Arstechnica,
6/10/14
technologies become more prevalent. Beyond our duty to
investigate, report on, and explain the implications of these
issues, the journalism industry should evaluate its relation-
ship to efforts like Digital Due Process. In our own work, we
must continue to be rigorous in protecting the privacy of our
sources and readers, not just in reporting but in publication.
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Conclusion
“The only successful, robust way to address problems that
involve personal responsibility and behavior is with social
rather than technological tools. If we instead try and re-
strict behavior technologically… the only result will be an
arms race that nobody wins.”
–Dr. Greg Jackson61 61AT&T
willing to
spy for NSA,
MPAA, and
RIAA, Nate
Anderson.
Arstechnica,
6/13/07
The legal and tehnical infrastructure of today’s digital
communication systems has enormous implications for jour-
nalistic source protection, and keeping our industry on stable
footing given the ever-shifting ground at the intersection of
these two fields will require significant education, organiza-
tion and innovation from the journalistic profession as whole.
The recommendations presented here can neither be out-
sourced nor implemented overnight. But by pursuing the
education of our colleagues, the coordination of our insti-
tutions, and collabortion with the digital security field, we
can provide better protection to our sources and ourselves.
Only by doing this can we protect our ability to hold power
accountable, serve the public, and honor in practice the spirit
of existing shield protections.
Perhaps even more than this, the journalism industry
can help support those working for the freedom of the press
all over the world by using and innovating around secure,
usable digital communication tools. Only through long-term
partnerships and/or the support of a recognized market
can truly sustainable solutions be developed; journalistic
organizations can and should be that market, for their own
sake as well as the public’s. The collective force and voice
of our industry can help spur not only the technical but
the legal changes that will help all users recapture their
fundamental rights to privacy, freedom of association, and
freedom of expression. If we are not willing to vigorously and
emphatically fight for these rights, we may soon find that
we no longer recognize ourselves as either a profession, or a
nation.
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